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In this paper, we examine the increasing theoretical and practical importance
of Yisk’  and ‘risk factors ’ in applied psychological and medical settings. We
argue that ‘risk’ has become relatively disentangled from individual persons,
am-l has come instead to reside in a statistically-created hybrid of the personal,
the social and the economic. To illustrate this theoretical point, we discuss the
use of a medical technique in suspected cases of child sexual abuse: while
‘risk’ is a powerful instrument for thought and action in modern society, in the
case we discuss it has met with much resistance, and ultimately can be refused
in favour of older theoretical models such as dangerousness.
In the recent sociological literature, the idea that we live in a ‘risk society’ has become the
occasion of much theoretical and empirical research (see, for example, Beck 1992; Douglas
1992). Although this theoretical paradigm has yet to make much of an impact on
psychology, we suggest that in the applied field of psychology which we might term the
psychologico-medical, the notions of ‘risk’ and of ‘risk factors’ have come to play
increasingly important roles in practical interventions and in theoretical orientations (Castel,
1991).
Psychology and medicine are, perhaps, the two most important discourses which regulate the
life of the child in modern society (Hacking, 1991; Rose, 1993). In particular, the problem
of child welfare has been a fertile ground for psychological and medical expertise to invent
theories, diagnose ailments, and propose solutions. Our paper takes as its topic the
increasingly debated topic of child sexual abuse, and examines the way in which psychology
and medicine have changed the ways we understand ‘the  child and its family, and how we
conceptualise  the right of experts to make ‘appropriate’ interventions (Armstrong, 1983). In
brief, we argue that there has been an attempt to make the concept of ‘dangerousness’ in
relation to the child sexual abuser more amenable to scientific knowledge and intervention by
way of its reformulation as a variety of ‘risk factors’. In this way, concepts such as
‘suspicion’ can be rendered scientifically knowable and tractable. However, the professional
‘turf war’ that has taken place in relation to child sexual abuse has made the diagnosis of risk
problematic; a series of resistances to scientific technique shows how such techniques are
fundamentally social.
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Our strategy for beginning this inquiry is to analyse the use of, and to explore the
controversy surrounding the use of, Reflex Anal Dilatation (RAD) as a diagnostic sign of
child sexual abuse. This controversy was seen very clearly in Britain in the Cleveland Affair
(Report of the Inquiry into Child Abuse in Cleveland 1987, 1988),  during which the sign of
RAD was the focus of so much of the furore. However, this sign has had a long and
previously uncontroversial medical history, especially in medico-legal attempts to ascertain
the existence of adult male homosexual relations. There is, then, something interesting and
puzzling in the apparent need to reassess the reliability and validity of this sign, and in its
rejection as a valid indicator of sexual abuse by many commentators on the case. In the first
part of the paper, we explore these debates and comment on the similarities and differences
in the deployment of this sign in cases of child sexual abuse and in cases of adult homosexual
acts. We then make use of this material to argue that the elimination of ‘dangerous
individuals’, using a probabilistic ‘risk’ model is likely to be refused. The use of forensic
techniques to diagnose familial pathology cannot operate simply in terms of this new
language of risk. We suggest that the relation between ‘science’ and family welfare is
complex, and this  complexity is exacerbated by competing forms of expertise.
Before continuing, we offer a number of disclaimers. We are not trying to assess the various
types of reliability or validity of RAD as a sign of child sexual abuse, or to offer a moral
judgment on its use, or to comment upon the worth of various professional roles. Nor are
we in any sense suggesting a moral equivalence between homosexual acts and the actions of a
child sexual abuser. It should also be clear that our attempt to describe some factors in the
construction of the child sex abuser is not an attempt to legitimate a set of practices we
regard as intolerable. Rather, we are trying to investigate the historical deployment of a
scientific technique, within psychological and medical expertise, as a starting point for
thinking about risk and the psychologico-medical.
,REFL,EX ANAL DILATATION: THE USE OF A SCIENTIFIC TECJ3NIQUE
Reflex Anal Dilatation (RAD) as a technique of forensic medicine became a national talking
point in Britain after “Cleveland”. Essentially, the technique involves an anal examination of
the child and an assessment of whether the anus exhibits an abnormal dilatation reflex. The
presence of this reflex is taken as an indication that the anus has become used to
experiencing penetrating objects. Much of the controversy around the Cleveland affair
stemmed from the use of this technique on children, when there were no grounds for
suspecting sexual abuse. While the  use of this technique, (also sometimes known as the ‘0’
sign, reflex relaxation of the anus, and the lateral buttock traction test), has become infamous
in the context of child sexual abuse, its history as “a sign” is perhaps less familiar. It had
been known for some time as an indicator of homosexual acts, with a large number of
publications in the 1950s and 1960s referring to it. However, it is worth pointing out that
these reported observations were exclusively clinical, and we can find no evidence of
scientific attempts to evaluate its validity or reliability until “Cleveland”. The technique
seems to have developed from a series of procedures in forensic pathology and forensic
medicine, dating from about a hundred years ago, which stressed the importance of the
examination of the anus where there was suspicion of homosexual acts. Polson, Gee, and
Knight (1985) cite work by Ambroise Tardieu (1819-l 879) on anal signs of sodomy. The
importance of anal signs is unquestioned in the medico-legal literature, and when RAD
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becomes a standard forensic technique, it is an unproblematic clinical sign (see, for example,
Paul, 1975).
Reflex anal dilatation was initially reported as a possible sign of homosexual acts. In more
recent times, Feigen (1954) reported the results of proctological examinations of fifty
homosexual prison inmates and eighteen ‘private patients’ who admitted to having practised
or were presumed to have practised passive sodomy. Feigen included in his battery of tests a
digital examination. He found that in thirty cases from the fifty prison inmates there  was a
“possibly diagnostic sign” where, as “the examining finger entered the anal canal, there was
a sudden, brief contraction of the sphincters.. . immediately followed by pronounced
relaxation of the musculature of the anal canal, which then appeared widened” (p.  8 1). The
same sign was said to be present in the majority of the males in the private patient group.
Gancz (1962) described how in the “majority of homosexuals.. . when the cheeks are
separated.. . the sphincter, almost as a reflex, dilates and a central hole appears when the
folds separate. A normal sphincter would resist the insertion of the finger while the anal
sphincter in the homosexual dilates almost in a reflex manner” (Gancz 1962, p. 263). Mant
(1960, p. 243) and Fatteh (1962) also refer to this dilatation of the sphincter. The
recommendations of Paul (1975) state that in ‘normal’ tests, when the buttocks of a person
are gently separated while in a standard position for examination of the anal region (left
lateral or knee-elbow position differences in the sign elicited in these positions), there is a
refle  contraction of the external anal sphincter. If the buttocks remain separated the
sphincter relaxes to its original tone but does not gape open. However, in people who have
experienced repeated anal intercourse, when the buttocks remain separated and the sphincter
relaxes, there is gaping or dilatation, Gee (in Polson et. al, 1985) points  out that though a
“lax anus... is not of itself sufficient proof [of buggery] “, a “widely gaping anal canal has of
itself great significance” (p. 488). While ‘widely gaping’ is not the same as ‘dilatation’ - the
latter being very much a dynamic sign - the strong weight attributed to gaping is relevant
here. Fatteh also lists a patulous anus without radial folds or relapse of the rectal mucosa as
significant.
It is necessary to comment that in relation to the problem of the diagnosis of homosexuality,
RAD was only one of a battery of objective scientific techniques which aimed unequivocally
to provide evidence of unnatural practices. RAD could be used as a sign in cases of alleged
homosexual rape, but, importantly, it could also be used in attempts to secure convictions
where no complaint had been made by any of the parties involved - for example, in cases in
the armed forces. A contemporaneous diagnostic tool which tried to do the same job with
regard to the detection of an otherwise invisible danger was the gag reflex test; the persistent
fellationist was thought not to exhibit the reflex of gagging when objects were introduced into
the mouth and throat (see Cornsweet & Hayes 1946, Gioscia, 1950). In summary, then,
medical techniques such as RAD and the gag reflex test were used to adjudicate on the
presence of a category of person - the homosexual; in this  way, the medical and the
psychological were closely linked, as medical information was used to make inferences
beyond  the purely medical domain and into the area of lifestyle, sexuality, and the law.
It is not the purpose of this paper to review and evaluate these techniques further, but rather
to acknowledge that our understanding of them is now embedded in the context of a scientific
debate about the worth of the sign - a debate provoked by “Cleveland” and child sex abuse
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but not, we would stress, by previous use of RAD in the identification of homosexual acts
and homosexuals, As we develop our argument, we shall suggest that this controversy tells
us something about the problems of risk management in family life. While a consensus
about the utility of risk management in the case of homosexuality existed in the 195Os,  there
was no challenge to the objectivity of scientific technique or the good practice of a highly
regarded group of professionals. When the technique was relocated to put familial
relationships under the microscope, the turf war that ensued was such that scientific
technique and professional expertise were carefully scrutinised  and ultimately reassessed.
CLEVELAND: REDEPLOYMENT OF A SIGN
In January 1987, Dr Marietta Higgs, one of the central figures in the use of RAD as a sign,
became a consultant paediatrician  in the South Tees Health District, joining a team that
included Dr Wyatt, who was also to become one of the central figures in the controversy.
Dr Higgs had become familiar with the technique and the use of the sign as a possible
indicator of child sexual abuse through the work of Dr Wynne at Leeds (see also Hobbs &
Wynne, 1986). In 1986, while in her previous post in Newcastle, Dr Higgs (using RAD as
part of the diagnostic procedure) had ‘diagnosed’ two children as having been sexually
abused. The subsequent use of this technique in the Cleveland Affair gave rise to fears of
’ overdiagnosis’ . As the controversy raged oue and the value of the sign became a matter of
some importance (see Campbell, 1988 for a more detailed discussion of the affair). As we
have made clear in the above section, there was very little rigorous scientific evaluation of
the sign of IUD,  or controversy over its significance, when it was used as a possible
indicator of homosexual acts between adults. Yet, since “Cleveland”, and the transfer of the
technique to the analysis of child sexual abuse, there has been an explosion of scientific
inquiry into this issue, even though the worth of physical signs in identifying child sexual
abuse is acknowledged by many to be very limited (see for example, Kerns, 1981).
Interestingly enough, however techniques of vaginal examination of young girls, as detailed
in, for example, Cantwell  (1983) and White, Ingram, and Lyna (1989),  seem to have caused
little controversy and seem to be regarded as providing compelling evidence of sexual abuse.
The debate has continued over the form of the sign and over variations in terminology (for
example, whether dilatation as a term should refer to opening of the internal sphincter, rather
than the external sphincter - see the Cleveland Report, (Report of the inquiry into child abuse
in Cleveland, 1987, 1988, p. 190)); whether or not the sign can be caused by other factors
apart from experiences of anal penetration, such as chronic constipation (see, for example,
Clayden, 1988); the positive predictive accuracy of such signs (Paradise, 1989); and, perhaps
most importantly, the general notion of ‘normal’ variation (see McCann, Voris, Simon, &
Wells, 1989). Its reliability has also been assessed by the doctors at the centre of the
introduction of the technique, Hobbs and Wynne (1989). We suggest that even if these
debates were to be resolved to the satisfaction of the professional community (so satisfying
the Frye rule of the legal process - Scott, 1989) this would not be sufficient to explain the
status of the sign in use. It is not, we argue, a case of ‘science reaching its limits or of
‘science being an inadequate framework’. Instead, we suggest that the case of RAD
highlights science as inextricably woven into other processes, from which it cannot be
abstracted. We do not think it is possible to separate out science in general, and medicine
and psychology in particular, from our consideration of this case. We do not, for example,
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wish to characterise  these disciplines as power-broking, machiavellian practices (Campbell,
1988). Medical and psychological practices are part of a constellation of services which
operate around the family and which constitute part of the social domain which administers
to it.
RAD was transferred from the domain of homosexuality to a domain which was regarded as
entirely separate and conceptually distinct - the internal (sexual) relations of the family. As a
consequence of this redeployment a new set of inter-professional disputes were aroused.
During Cleveland (and after), the refusal of the legal system to accept the sign of RAD as a
reliable indicator of child sexual abuse resulted in a crisis for medical expertise and an
opportunity for psychologists to stake a claim to ‘interpret’ the bare medical evidence. Such
a response - the complexification of the issue, the competition between different forms of
expertise, and the rhetorical argument that scientific failure is an indicator that more and
better science is needed - is typical of the scientifico-legal controversies which enter the
public domain (Wynne,  1982). No doubt the increased scale of the application of the
technique of RAD was also a spur to an intensified concern with its validity.
TRANSLATING TECHNIQUES: MAKING THE CHILD SEXUAL ABUSER VISIBLE
The health sciences, for the past one hundred years, have been called upon to give us
techniques for making the dangerous homosexual visible - partly because they held the
promise of putting an end to secrecy. In particular, their objective has been to try to show
us the place on the body where, unarguably, secret acts are made to speak out and reveal
themselves to the scientific observer. It is, perhaps, unsurprising that a translation of these
techniques to the area of suspected child sexual abuse was attempted.
For both homosexuality and child sex abuse, (though for different reasons) secrecy and the
need to ‘see beyond’ has played a central role. Indeed, Sununit  (1983) identified secrecy as
a necessary precondition for child sexual abuse, when perpetrator and victim know one
another well. Secrecy requires that social agencies develop means of seeing these acts -
‘windows’ - as many of the people involved with Cleveland termed them (Higgs, 1991). The
project of making child abuse visible, of ending the secrecy and collusion of the pathological
family unit, may have commenced in the early 1960s with Kempe’s work (see, for example,
Kempe, Silverman, Steele, Droegemueller, & Silver, 1962),  but the work on the creation of
child sex abuse as a distinct medico-legal category began in earnest much later, from the mid
1970s. By referring to this ‘act of creation’ we do not, of course, mean that child sexual
abuse did not happen before this time. What we are suggesting is that prior to the 198Os,
there did not exist the same resources for categorising  such behaviours. The category of the
child sexual abuser only came into being once lawyers, social workers, politicians, medics,
journalists, academics, and members of the ‘general public’ began to use it in their various
practices.
The NSPCC figures during the 1980s evidenced an explosion of child sex abuse cases. AS
these emerged, it became apparent that the ‘bad apple’ theory of abuse was an unsatisfactory
explanatory device (although it is one yet to be entirely removed from popular and
professional consciousness). The creation of a new dangerous act and a new dangerous
individual - child  sex abuse and the child sex abuser - was a scientific venture embarked
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upon (with varying degrees of caution) by both professionals and the media. While methods
to diagnose this could have been gathered from a range of disciplines, a number of factors
suggests that medicine was well placed to play a dominant role. Medicine’s claims to
scientific rigour  and its prestigious position as a profession, gave credibility to assertions
from medical authorities. The use of the concept of diagnosis and the ‘objectivity’ of
physical signs in previous work on child physical abuse (e.g., Kempe et al., 1962) and in
‘successtil’ identification of dangerous individuals in general gave particular urgency to the
search for physical signs that would be indicative of childhood sexual abuse. The strong
hope was that medicine, rather than, say, psychology, could again provide certain answers.
In this context, the work of two paediatricians  from Leeds, Chris Hobbs and Jane Wynne,
was almost bound to attract considerable attention.
FAILING  TO TRANSLATE THE TECHNIQUE
What sets apart the use of the technique of RAD in the cases of homosexual acts and in the
case of child sexual abuse, then, is a difference in its reception in the latter case as an
objective scientific test. In both cases, the same technique did the same job - identify anal
penetration and allow an inference to be made about the presence of a dangerous individual -
but in the latter case, the claims of one group of experts to ‘science’ and scientific
explanation began to be challenged. Why was the translation of this technique refused?
The work of Robert Caste1  (1991) allows us to begin to understand this problem. Caste1 has
suggested that in certain areas of social administration, the notion of dangerousness has
recently been undergoing a radical reconceptualisation. He discusses, in particular, the
French ‘GAMIN’ project which aims to break down the aggregate of “dangerousness” into a
series of factors. ‘GAMIN’ is an attempt to register huge amounts of information about
children and families; the aim is to adjudicate in cases where there is the presence of risk, as
determined by a rationalised checklist of factors. For example, the presence of a particular
risk factor (teenage pregnancy, or unemployment, or alcoholism, or other ‘factorised’ social
evils) can be used to justify intervention by a welfare agency. The whole system is
computerised, so it becomes easier to give various weightings to different factors, and alerts
agencies to intervene when a family has exceeded a preset level of risk.
It seems to us that an attempt has been made to use the technique of RAD as something like
a factor in the diagnosis of child sexual abuse. However, a factor is rather like a
synecdoche; its purpose is to represent and to indicate a series of problems of which it is
only a small part - indeed, in itself, the loss of the anal dilatation reflex is unimportant.
What the sign represents is the crucial issue. In the case of homosexuality, such a
synecdoche worked - nobody needed convincing that the social evil of homosexuality existed
and that its existence was proven by this objective sign, and there was also no professional
dispute to disturb the inference from medical sign to psychological and behavioural category.
In the case of child sexual abuse, there was a professional and popular resistance to going
beyond the sign, to seeing the horror that was implied by the technique. The resistance took
the form of disputing the premise; surely IUD  could not be a reliable indicator of sexual
abuse?
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While we think Castel’s analysis of the reorganisation of the logic of social welfare is
extremely important for anyone interested in this area, we would add that it is worth
stressing just how quickly techniques of ‘governmentality’ (Foucault, 1991) are being refined
and readjusted, and consequently how many opportunities there are for governmental
initiatives to be disputed and derailed. Castel’s general point is that the business of spotting
danger and risk is undergoing a hyper-rationalisation; however, we suggest that this
rationalisation is dependent on professional and popular consensus - even a statistically
significant correlation will mean nothing, if this consensus does not exist. In general, then,
Caste1  has argued convincingly for the intrusion of new modes of surveillance. These modes
of surveillance operate, not by a consideration of the whole individual or the complete family
unit, but by a process of inference from something i&a-individual: a factor or a sign, We
suggest that this transition is bound to be fraught with difficulties. First of all, the use of
any ‘risk factor’ as an indication of dangerousness is reliant on a science of probabilities.
Factors may well indicate dangerousness, but they may also generate some ‘false positive’
cases, There is a general problem here with any such probabilistic system, in that the
probabilities are gathered from the consideration of large populations, and these probabilities
cannot then be applied logically to individual cases. In some sense, the Cleveland affair was
about the refusal of the logic of factorisation. It was relatively easy to mount a campaign
which suggested that using RAD as a ‘window’ was impossible because of the generation of
false positive diagnoses of abuse.
In addition, Caste1 makes the point that the task of making risk factors visible is one which
falls increasingly to executants and administrators, with more and more specialist knowledge
and less and less ability to make a judgment on the wider view. While it is possible to read
Castel’s piece as an indication that the future of risk detection in welfare provision belongs to
an executant administrative class, each member of which can deal with a specific infra-
individualistic element, the experience of Cleveland suggests that such a transition may not
be easy. Certain forms of expertise may be refused, if they do not appear to connect up with
a wider, often common-sense reading of a situation, and with other professional diagnoses.
Furthermore, we would suggest that Castel’s work cannot be used to provide a model of how
the health sciences and processes of welfare operate; in the Cleveland affair, the notion of
risk factor was put into play, but was ultimately refused iu  favour of a more old-fashioned
conception of the ‘dangerous individual’. By this, we mean that the weight of evidence of
abuse had to be derived - especially in terms of testimony - in relation to a specific person;
the judgment of abuse took place at the individual, rather than at the infra-individual, level.
In the Cleveland affair, then, the attempt to rationalise the diagnosis of danger was refused,
partly because there was no professional or popular consensus that a causal link between
RAD and sexual abuse could be made. We suggest that the operation of scientific  technique
cannot  be seen as a separate domain, above the  hurly-burly of public debate, but is enmeshed
withiu  everyday practices and beliefs, and depends upon them for its effectivity and its truth
value.
THE FAMILY: NODAL POINT OF LIBERAL GOVERNMENT
The account given by Donzelot (1979) of the role of the family in practices of liberal
government is helpful at this point in our discussion. Domelot’s  account aims to sidestep
Constructing Risk: Psychology, Medicine and Child Welfare 21
thinking of the family in purely functional, political terms, and refuses to think of the family
as a purely private space with its own internal mores and modes of organisation. Rather, he
wishes us to understand the family as a relay of different and varied forms of power. Forms
of family life are in turn produced by the various strategies which target the family, either as
a whole, or in terms of its individual members. Thus, for example, one of his arguments is
that a certain intensification of family life is made possible by a series of strategies which
aim to guarantee the health of children in families, as well as by strategies which give a
privileged position to the mother in terms of the educational and hygienic government of the
family.
It seems to us that Donzelot makes two crucial moves which help us understand the modem
family and its relation to welfare strategies. First, he makes it clear that we can no longer
understand the family as a prop for patriarchal or capitalist relations - the various strategies
which play on the surface of the family are too heterogeneous and too anonymous for such a
reading; second, he disrupts a simple notion of the family as a ‘private’ sphere, as if ‘public’
concerns stopped at the threshold of the family home - for example, he details how the
modem family is no longer an autonomous unit, outside the public sphere and governed by
the patriarch, but a unit which has been ‘opened up’ to a variety of forms of inspection and
scrutiny. Donzelot’s first move enables us to be suspicious of explanations of the fate of
IUD  in terms of a reaffirmation of the privacy of the family and the power of the father
within the family. His second move allows us to analyse how the family is constituted and
maintained in terms of strategies which comprehend it as simultaneously public and private.
It is precisely this oscillation between the family as a public institution and as a private
institution which allows child welfare to operate and which provides conditions of possibility
for the reproduction and evolution of the familial unit (see also Ashenden, 1994).
The main argument, then, is that the family is simultaneously a public and a private
institution. There are, clearly, many departments of existence where the family is allowed
its own internal economy; and there are, just as clearly, many others departments where
public intervention is legitimate and expected. The family is caught up in the criss-crossings
of these public/private strategies. It is, in fact, a site of constant tension for this reason
(think of the contrasting claims of ‘child welfare’ and ‘parents’ rights’ in the Cleveland
affair, for example, which work through contrasting notions of the family as public and
hence fair game for interventions, and the family as private and thus as inviolable). One
might note here a general tension in forms of liberal administration - one must govern
effectively, but one must not govern too much.
If we return to our example with these observations in mind, we can begin to make sense of
the rather complex picture presented to us after Cleveland. First of all, in the case of the use
of RAD as a diagnostic technique in the case of suspected homosexual acts, we suggest that
the lack of controversy stems from a general consensus about homosexuality as a public
danger. The idea of homosexual acts as part of a private domain was certainly not absent,
but it is precisely because the public health consequences of homosexuality were taken to be
so severe that no controversy about an invasion of privacy ensued. It is worth noting that
there is also a public/private tension in interventions into homosexual acts, but in the recent
past at any rate, these interventions have been recuperable within the logic of liberalism,
precisely because the public dangers have been taken to outweigh rights of privacy.
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Consequently, a generalised logic of dangerousness has been employed to oversee a set of
techniques to make the homosexual knowable and administrable within public health
discourses. The Wolfenden Report was one such example of a governmental strategy which
was able to come into being because of scientifico-technical devices, like RAD and the gag
reflex test, which made homosexuality visible. Homosexuality, then, was targetted as one of
a series of dangers which required public intervention. The work of inference that needed to
be done from the sign to the dangerous act and dangerous individual was carried out easily
and smoothly, and the value of ‘science’, in the shape of medical and forensic technique, was
undisputed.
However, in the case of child sexual abuse, interventions into the  familial unit and into the
life of the child had to move between understandings of these domains as public and private.
The story of Cleveland is the story of that tension. Clearly it is a public issue, or the
children would never have been examined and put into care; and just as clearly it is a private
issue, as the refusal of the medical sign, the return of many of the children to their homes,
and the concern for parental rights, prove. Yet it would be over-simplistic to assert that
Cleveland is a story of the victory of the private over the public. The various
recommendations of the report and the subsequent review and strengthening of welfare
services suggest that it is more the case that a constant entanglement of public and private is
played out in the area of family welfare. The ‘failure’ of the liberal administration of the
family (and one way or another, we must be talking about ‘failure’ here - either we have
failed to protect children adequately or we have wrongly intervened into the private domain -
that is, we have either governed too little or too much) is a spur to the constant recalibration
of the techniques which measure pathology and normality, and the strategies which these
techniques permit. Failure has a crucial place in our analysis, as the failure of administration
is not the occasion for its displacement, but the spur to further revamp techniques of
government; because it is the failure of the family unit in the first place that provides the
pretext for the adjustment and correction of deficiency. Donzelot goes as far as to say that
failure is built in to the family mechanism (1979))  precisely because the modem family is
that which fails, which needs gentle correction and regulation. Without failure, there would
be no welfare, there would be no ‘social’.
Child sexual abuse stands outside of the logic of risk which has been described by Castel.
The attempt to use a ‘factor’ to indicate a need for intervention was a principle which was
refused by the courts; RAD was the weak link in the chain which failed to hold as the debate
oscillated between competing forms of professional expertise.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we have addressed the general problem of the knowledge and administration of
dangerousness, in relation to child sexual abuse and homosexuality. We have presented this
by concentrating on the role of a rather humble scientific technique, IUD, which has been
used in each of these domains, although with differing consequences. We have suggested
that the work of Foucault and Caste1  on dangerousness and risk is an important resource for
thinking about these problems, and has enabled us to understand how homosexual acts have
been made visible and governed. We had suggested that there is a logic of dangerousness,
within which homosexual acts have been understood, and a consensus on the dangerousness
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of homosexuality has allowed interventionist policies to take place, based, in some instances,
on a diagnostic sign. The administration and policing of child sexual abuse has been more
complex, because interventions into the familial unit have led to a series of professional
disagreements about the validity of ‘risk factors’. We have followed Donzelot in seeing the
family as a dynamic unit, a unit for the generation of relations of power. No doubt some of
the patterns we have identified are a subset of the various dynamics at work (some of which
are very parochial) in the domains of homosexuality and child sexual abuse. We do not wish
to argue for a simple ‘correlation’ between these two domains, particularly since in the case
of child sexual abuse there is a professional ‘turf war’ going on as to which experts have the
prime competence to judge abuse. Psychologists and medicos are two of the most important
of these expert groups, and each is ready to step in, if the other’s diagnostic and curative
techniques come into question.
It might be thought that the rejection of RAD at Cleveland was a blow to the prestige of the
medical profession and a restitution of patriarchal authority and the sanctity of the family.
What we would suggest is that the continuing problematisation of child sexual abuse, and the
ongoing debate about limits and duties of intervention, suggest that the story is not over.
The reassessment of RAD, and debates over other candidate indicators of abuse (child
testimony, precocious sexualisation, etc.) are part of a process of reconfiguring government,
and the constant readjustment of its aims and of its limits. For example, the common
reading of the welfare authorities as being rather too interventionist and heavy-handed in the
Cleveland affair has, it has been argued, led to an attempt to restore autonomy to the family
and its members through devices such as the 1989 Children’s Act (Bell, 1993). The family
is surely destined to be a prime site for future regroupings of governmental strategies and of
resistances to government. Psychology and medicine are destined to continue to play crucial
roles in these strategies and resistances.
Acknowledgement: We thank Samantha  Ashenden  and Geoffrey Wyatt for their comments
on earlier drafts of this paper.
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AUTHORS’ RESPONSES TO REVIEWERS’ COMMENTARY ON CONSTRUCTING
RISK: PSYCHOLOGY, MEDICINE AND CHILD WELFARE
The paper has little to say about the turf war, social nature of scientific knowledge, or the
application of risk factors.
We find this judgment mystifying, as the paper regularly refers to the turf war between
different expert groups, and suggests it as a causal factor in the rejection of medical
technique. Our detailed discussion of liberalism and the family as implicated in the
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